Actively open-minded thinking : development of a shortened scale and disentangling attitudes towards knowledge and people

Actively open-minded thinking (AOT) is often used as a proxy for reflective thinking in research on reasoning and related fields. It is associated with less biased reasoning in many types of tasks. However, few studies have examined its psychometric properties and criterion validity. We developed a shortened, 17-item version of the AOT for quicker administration. AOT17 is highly correlated with the original 41-item scale and has highly similar relationships to other thinking dispositions, social competence and supernatural beliefs. Our analyses revealed that the AOT is not a unitary construct, but comprises four distinct dimensions, some of which concern attitudes towards knowledge, and others concern attitudes towards people. This factor structure was replicated in another data-set, and correlations with other measures in four data-sets (total N = 3345) support the criterion validity of these dimensions. Different dimensions were responsible for the AOT's relationships with other thinking dispositions.Peer reviewe

A dual process account of creative thinking

This article explicates the potential role played by type 1 thinking (automatic, fast) and type 2 thinking (effortful, logical) in creative thinking. The relevance of Evans's (2007) models of conflict of dual processes in thinking is discussed with regards to creative thinking. The role played by type 1 thinking and type 2 thinking during the different stages of creativity (problem finding and conceptualization, incubation, illumination, verification and dissemination) is discussed. It is proposed that although both types of thinking are active in creativity, the extent to which they are active and the nature of their contribution to creativity will vary between stages of the creative process. Directions for future research to test this proposal are outlined; differing methodologies and the investigation of different stages of creative thinking are discussed. © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

Delusional beliefs and reason giving

Delusions are often regarded as irrational beliefs, but their irrationality is not sufficient to explain what is pathological about them. In this paper we ask whether deluded subjects have the capacity to support the content of their delusions with reasons, that is, whether they can author their delusional states. The hypothesis that delusions are characterised by a failure of authorship, which is a dimension of self knowledge, deserves to be empirically tested because (a) it has the potential to account for the distinction between endorsing a delusion and endorsing a framework belief; (b) it contributes to a philosophical analysis of the relationship between rationality and self knowledge; and (c) it informs diagnosis and therapy in clinical psychiatry. However, authorship cannot provide a demarcation criterion between delusions and other irrational belief states

Measures of Bayesian Reasoning Performance on 'Normal' and 'Natural' Frequency Tasks

While the majority of similar studies examining Bayesian reasoning investigate how participants avoid common errors such as base-rate neglect, the current research also examines whether different formats (frequency and probability) lead to a difference in levels of absolute accuracy. In Study One, older (≥60 years) and younger (18 to 29 years) participants completed tasks in probability and normalized frequency formats. In Study 2, participants completed tasks in probability and natural frequency formats. Findings are that frequencies lead to less over-estimation, particularly in natural frequency tasks, which also reveal an interaction between age and task format whereby older adults seem unaffected by format. There was no association found between format and the avoidance of errors such as base-rate neglect. Findings are discussed in the light of dual and multi-process theories of reasoning, having failed to support the theory that frequency formats elicit System 2 reasoning processes

Employing culturally responsive pedagogy to foster literacy learning in schools

 In recent years it has become increasingly obvious that, to enable students in schools from an increasingly diverse range of cultural backgrounds to acquire literacy to a standard that will support them to achieve academically, it is important to adopt pedagogy that is responsive to, and respectful of, them as culturally situated. What largely has been omitted from the literature, however, is discussion of a relevant model of learning to underpin this approach. For this reason this paper adopts a socio-cultural lens (Vygotsky, 1978) through which to view such pedagogy and refers to a number of seminal texts to justify of its relevance. Use of this lens is seen as having a particular rationale. It forces a focus on the agency of the teacher as a mediator of learning who needs to acknowledge the learner’s cultural situatedness (Kozulin, 2003) if school literacy learning for all students is to be as successful as it might be. It also focuses attention on the predominant value systems and social practices that characterize the school settings in which students’ literacy learning is acquired. The paper discusses implications for policy and practice at whole-school, classroom and individual student levels of culturally-responsive pedagogy that is based on a socio-cultural model of learning. In doing so it draws on illustrations from the work of a number of researchers, including that of the author